



DIAA, Inc.
P.O. Box 489
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Spring 2007



DIAA LOG



Defense Intelligence Alumni Association

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View from the President

Fellow Alumni:

As I write this letter, summer is near and many are planning annual vacations with family and friends. Your association has been very active in 2007 and our activities have been humming along nicely.

On the administrative side (*Communiqué* receipt and distribution) communication to members and membership database are working smoothly. We are also making progress on the web site and have defined the requirements for the member's only section. There are a few areas that remain to be addressed and they should be taken care of soon. The website "will be the place" to remain current on DIAA events and activities.

On the program side, we had a great luncheon in March featuring Mark Ewing giving a presentation on the DNI. You will see a summary of Mark's presentation elsewhere in the newsletter. I was heartened to see the numbers in attendance at the Mount Vernon Inn. We had 57 members there, our largest contingent of attendees in several years. Thus far we've had a number of the Defense Intelligence Forum programs, the last featuring Dr. Walt Barrows speaking on the Chinese influence in Africa and sponsored jointly with DACOR, Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired, the State Department retiree association in Washington. These events have been well attended as well. By the time you receive this newsletter our May forum will have been held on May 16th where Mr. John Wahlquist spoke on *Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future*. Some of us have received welcomed feedback on the luncheon and forum venues. Your comments are helpful and appreciated.

We are starting to plan for the DIAA Homecoming. It will probably be scheduled in the last two weeks of September, or the first week of October. Plan on attending. Last year's program was fantastic and I expect this year's to be equally enjoyable and rewarding. I hope to see you there.

Best regards and wishes for the summer,

George Souza, DIAA President

DIAA Calendar

June 19th - Defense Intel Forum @ Alpine Inn

July 18th - Defense Intel Forum

August - Summer Luncheon TBA

September or October – DIAA Homecoming TBA

November – Fall Annual Business Meeting TBA

DIAA will hold occasional member social (no agenda) lunches.

DIAA Calendar 2007

JUNE

19th - Defense Intel Forum @ Alpine Inn

JULY

18th - Defense Intel Forum

AUGUST

TBA - Summer Luncheon

SEPTEMBER or OCTOBER

TBA – DIAA Homecoming

NOVEMBER

TBA – Fall Annual Business Meeting

DIAA will hold occasional member social (no agenda) lunches.

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DIAA Membership Guidelines

In our efforts to establish a correct DIAA data base, we have determined that there are about a dozen members for whom we do not have correct contact data. If you are one of the following, or a friend of one of the following, please provide your/their correct email address and phone number! Thanks.

Anderson, J.M. "Andy"
Harvey, Donald P.
Henderson, Robert M.
Hudson, John K.
Johnson, Kenneth T.
McCausland, Mary E.

Newman, David B
Norris, Richard C.
Pritchard, Robert T.
Reny, Robert
Smith, Marc A.
Watson, III

Email addresses are important because email is our primary means of communication with DIAA members. In the future, to save on postage costs, the Communiqué, flyers, and the Newsletter will only be mailed to members who have paid their dues.

The Board has established a two-tier price for future DIAA luncheons. DIAA members and their guests will be charged a specified amount, but lapsed and non-members will be charged an additional \$10. A letter was sent in January reminding members to pay their annual dues (due on the anniversary of their enrollment).

Incidentally, DIAA Board of Director's meetings are scheduled for the 2nd Tuesday of each month during 2007. Please provide comments or suggestions you may have to a Board member prior to a monthly meeting to allow the Board to consider your ideas!

DIAA Membership Application

New Membership Renewal

Name Last First Middle Initial

Address

City, State, Zip

Contact: Home Office Fax

Email

History: Retiree Employee Other Last DIA Element

Length of Service at DIA yrs Retirement/Reassignment Date

Military Service: Yes No Service Rank

What interests do you want DIAA, Inc. to pursue

Would you be willing to volunteer to help DIAA, Inc. with: Newsletter Luncheon meeting Fundraising Office work Computer assistance Other Legal advice Budget Preparation Directory Membership Drive

Can we give your name to other DIAA, Inc. members? YES NO Would you like to be listed in the DIAA Directory? YES NO

Annual Membership Dues: \$30 Donation: Total Amount

Please make checks out to DIAA, Inc. and mail to: DIAA P.O. Box 489, Hamilton, VA 20159

Five years after his retirement, Mr. Negus said in a letter to the editor of the New York Times that the post-Cold War nation still needed a strong CIA.

“Intelligence must still monitor and interpret the major, glacierlike, regional geopolitical power shifts in all continents, and it will be of immense importance to our future well-being,” he wrote. “Future strategic threats include the Asian economic explosion; the declining rationale for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Japan’s growing political power; the increased economic strength of a confederated Europe, and Russia’s future position in Eurasia.”

A native of Syracuse, N.Y., Mr. Negus graduated from his home town’s LeMoyne College. He worked as an electrical engineer with the Air Force’s Rome Air Development Center, where he did exploratory development research in communication satellites. He received a master’s degree in physics from Syracuse University and in 1973 received a master’s degree in national security studies from the National War College.

He was the DIA senior analyst for arms control negotiations on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was selected to be the first Soviet strategic defense intelligence officer in a pilot program to coordinate interagency assessments and intelligence.

After he left the federal government, Mr. Negus consulted for national intelligence organizations in strategic planning, future intelligence requirements and performance assessment.

Mr. Negus was awarded the President’s Exceptional Service Award, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Executive Service Award and two of the DIA director’s Exceptional Service Awards.

Survivors include his wife of 48 years, Barbara Negus of Lewes; six children, Catherine Kennedy of Coronado, Calif., Navy Cmdr. Thomas Negus of Virginia Beach, Margaret Burkhart of Jeffersonton, Va., Mary Negus and Laura Moore, both of Austin, and Dr. Charles Negus of San Diego; and 14 grandchildren.

Editors’ Comments

This is our fourth edition of DIAA Log, which we expect to publish on a quarterly basis. We welcome your feedback and suggestions via diaalumni@comcast.net

We welcome contributions from our readers. Articles sought include: Your life post-DIA; book, movie, or restaurant reviews; upcoming events of interest; volunteer opportunities; recommended websites; financial tips for retirees, etc. Book reviews on relevant topics are especially sought (intelligence, foreign and military affairs, etc.).

Thank you for your attention gentle readers! Your editors, Emmy and John



HAVEN'T HEARD FROM US LATELY?

Please call or email if you have changed email addresses or if you have moved.

DIAA, Inc.
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 571-426-0098

New Benefit Program for the Intelligence Community and IC Retirees

Information supplied by Terri Vandell of DIA's Human Resources Directorate

Last year, at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), CIA opened up its Compass Rose benefits program to active employees of IC agencies. Compass Rose benefits include health, life, long term care, disability and some other insurance options. Anyone who retires from or transfers to a non-IC agency loses the benefits or has to convert to a more expensive private policy. Recently, NSA introduced its new insurance benefits program called GEBA - Government Employee's Benefit Association that is comparable to Compass Rose. GEBA will hold open seasons for the various IC agencies in a staggered fashion. DIA's will run from 15 June to 16 August 2007. Retirees are eligible to join this plan provided they retired from an IC agency. GEBA's benefits include life insurance, travel insurance, pet insurance, disability insurance, long term care insurance, cancer insurance and much more. The best part of this plan is that once a member always a member. In addition it also offers some benefits to spouses as well. Karen Stoner, the GEBA point of contact, can be reached at Karen@geba.com or phone (301) 688-7912. GEBA's website is www.geba.com (but it is going to change soon).

16 May Defense Intelligence Forum

Together with the National Defense Intelligence College Foundation (NDICF), DIAA sponsored a Forum that was held on 16 May at 1130 at The Alpine Restaurant in Arlington. Mr. John A. Wahlquist, a faculty member of the NDIC, spoke on the recently published *Intelligence Science Board Phase 1 Report: Educing Information (Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future)*. During 2004-05, Mr. Wahlquist was a member of the Iraq Survey Group in Baghdad where he headed Team Huwaysh, dedicated to debriefing senior Iraqi detainee 'Abd-al-Tawab Al Mullah Huwaysh, one of Saddam Hussein's former deputy prime ministers and the Minister of Military Industrialization. Wahlquist's 31-year military career included assignment as Defense and Air Attaché to Oman and Deputy Director of Intelligence at U.S. Central Command.

19 June Defense Intelligence Forum

DIAA and NDICF will sponsor a Forum on 19 June at 1130 at The Alpine Restaurant in Arlington. Mr. Russell Rochte will speak on *From Soft-Power to Soft-War*. Mr. Rochte's talk, will present lessons learned from his experience on the Media Staff Ride to Hollywood conducted by the National Defense University in 2005.

21 March Luncheon

Nearly 60 people attended the DIAA Spring Luncheon that was held at Mount Vernon Inn on Wednesday, 21 March. Ms. Laurie Kelly, DIA Director of Outreach, spoke about what's new at DIA. She said that the DIA is still attempting to "break-down walls" between operations and intelligence analysis. She noted that there has been increased sharing and collaboration among the various agencies of the Intelligence Community. She commented that 60 percent of DIA's workforce has been hired in the last 5 years. Lastly, she announced that Mr. Phil Roberts would be departing his assignment as Liaison Chief in London to become DIA's new Chief of Staff.



Mark Ewing, Principal Assistant Deputy DNI for Requirements, speaks at the March 21st DIAA Luncheon at the Mt Vernon Inn.

Mr. Mark Ewing, Principal Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Requirements since September 2005, and former DIA Deputy Director gave the keynote talk on “The National Intelligence Picture.” Mark noted that his boss, Vice Admiral (Ret) John M. McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), has a staff of 1539 people. But he explained that of that number, the DNI’s support staff is actually quite small. The bulk of the 15 hundred billets are composed of individuals serving in the national centers.

Lieutenant General Ron Burgess (Mark’s boss) is the Deputy Director for Customer Outcomes (Requirements). The ODNI staff also includes deputy directors for analysis, collection, and management, as well as six Mission Managers: Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation, North Korea, Iran, Counterintelligence and Cuba/Venezuela. Mark noted that the DNI’s deputy for S&T is now creating a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) equivalent. The Hill is supportive of the expanded role of the “Intelligence DARPA,” but some IC elements remain hesitant. There is a need to revolutionize technology within the IC—the Hill has complained about “wasted money” in this arena in the past.

Mark opined that the “Big 4” in the intelligence business—Bob Gates, Secretary of Defense; General Clapper, newly appointed Director of Military Intelligence (replacing Dr. Cambone); General Hayden, DCI, and McConnell, DNI—are good friends and that this is the optimal time (next 2 years) for this team to “get things right” in the Community. Mark commented that the “Executive Committee” under McConnell is the IC’s decision-making body. He noted that the national intelligence priorities are getting much more emphasis than in the past and that the President approves them. Issues facing the DNI include the need to reorganize the acquisition and intelligence requirements processes and the need to more closely integrate the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI into the Community. The Program Manager for Information Environment, Ted McNamara, is trying to increase sharing of intelligence to enhance the protection of the homeland. But Ewing explained that this is complex – given the diversity of the constituency at the state, local, and tribal levels.

An interesting innovation is McConnell’s reaching out to big US multi-national companies and organizations (via corporate sponsors such as CSIS, INSA, the Chamber of Commerce, and Business Round Table) to get their thoughts on issues of mutual concern to better the Community’s understanding of foreign cultures and contemporary issues. This is a deliberate expansion of the continuing partnership with representatives from Academia. This unique partnership of the analytical, business, and academic communities is producing great results. The DNI is meeting with a group of CEOs from major corporations to discuss relevant issues in late March.

Mark noted that McConnell has 10 priorities for the IC, hopefully to be initiated in the next 100 days:

- 1) Integrate the agencies of the Intelligence Community. This is difficult given the diverse cultures that characterize the various agencies. McConnell hopes that by mandating a joint-duty concept (requiring personnel to serve in more than one agency); and initiating joint performance management (standardizing salaries, benefits and performance ratings) he will encourage tighter IC alliances.
- 2) Increase interagency intelligence sharing. Try to eliminate the ORCON caveat. Place more emphasis on “Responsibility to Provide” and less reliance on the “Need to Know” concept.
- 3) Allow analysis to drive collection. This concept will be promoted by the Deputy Directors for Collection and Analysis.
- 4) Encourage “Red Team” approach to alternative analysis.
- 5) Improve and streamline the security clearance process. Drastically reduce the time taken to grant clearances from upwards of a year to as short a time as possible.
- 6) Bridge the gap between “foreign” and “domestic” intelligence.
- 7) Reinvigorate the National Clandestine Service and assure that it is community-focused. General Hayden, as National HUMINT Manager, is bringing together the 20+ elements of government that play a role in human intelligence activities.
- 8) Improve the Acquisition process and eliminate waste associated with it.
- 9) Encourage more foreign language and foreign area expertise within the analytical community. It is

players, knew the game, but saw them as impediments to be run over or bypassed. He had no sense of the political rules, didn’t want to know them. Rules—not of his making—were for dummies.

Once this mole was identified by the Bureau, it is interesting that there were no coded messages or, as in the Felix Bloch case, calls from a Russian handler warning “you’ve got the flu.” A good sign there might have been no others watching—no bigger mole—ready to warn, protect, or exfiltrate this Bureau spy, about to be flushed from hiding. Or, as some have suggested, he was now expendable. With retirement imminent and his productivity waning, who knows?...the Russians might have cleverly handed him up, avoiding payment of any money it claimed it had set aside, while another Russian pockets \$7 million from the info-for-money swap with the Bureau that eventually shut Hanssen down. Russians 1, Americans 0.

The Slice: Why Just Two Months? Prior to the purchase of the incontrovertible proof of Hanssen’s perfidy, which the FBI obtained with a \$7 million purchase of files and tapes from a Soviet source, the Bureau had put immense pressure—wrongly—for eighteen months on CIA Officer Brian Kelley. Despite little evidence. When these cases break, every agency is hoping it isn’t one of their own. The Bureau was convinced it couldn’t be one of theirs and with Kelley living in the same neighborhood as Hanssen, and jogging along some of the drop site paths, and “not” from the FBI, he became an ideal person of interest.

Unfortunately, their relentless and very public “interest” ruined Kelley’s career, in the same way they had ruined the life of Richard Jewell, who they falsely implicated in the Olympic Park bombings (the bomber turned out to be Eric Robert Rudolph), and the same way they have destroyed the career of military virologist Dr. Stephen Hatfield, by making him publicly known as “a person-of-interest” in the still-unsolved anthrax letters investigation.

What the film leaves out is how long it took the Bureau to finally accept they had the wrong man and, after much prodding, agree to look closer to home at the Agents with access to the compromised names and operations, who had never been polygraphed [Hanssen assiduously avoided any posting that came with being fluttered], eventually discovering that Hanssen was the mole. They have yet to formally apologize to Kelley, though one suspects that

might be more a case that a public apology increases exposure to legal action in this litigious era.

And last, for the film to include all the years of the twists and blind alleys the intelligence community underwent from that day in the mid-1980s when the Bureau first realized they were losing valuable Soviet assets, and ruled out Aldrich Hazen Ames, and then Edward Lee Howard as the reason, would have made the film far too long or incomprehensibly dense. Leaving out these missteps gives the illusion that the dots were easy to connect, and that there was little collateral damage. There should be a post-Hanssen film and it deserves to be told as well as director Billy Ray has presented here—the final two months—in Breach. See it.

In Memoriam

**Stan Ward
Robert M. Davis
Francis (Frank) Kennedy
Gordon Negus**

Gordon Negus, Former Executive Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Washington Post)

Gordon Negus, 72, former executive director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, died May 4 at his home in Lewes, Del. He had esophageal cancer.

Mr. Negus spent 32 years in government, working primarily as an analyst of Soviet strategy. He was the DIA’s executive director from 1986 to 1990, providing strategic planning and guidance for the military intelligence agency, managing the agency’s global intelligence resources and overseeing worldwide intelligence operations.

When Mr. Negus retired in 1990, Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said: “Mr. Negus played a vital role in formulating our country’s negotiating position on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Soviet Union. Through his efforts, the threat of nuclear holocaust has been reduced, making the world a safer place for all of us.”

So there should be no finger wagging as to why the CI personnel did not immediately focus on a “floridly different” Agent. While under the microscope of this film Agent Hanssen might appear worthy of immediate attention; in a day-to-day context, people like this do not stand out from the vast array of different personalities one meets, all entrusted with classified information, and capable of committing espionage. Eccentrics in general have not fitted the mole profile; rather it has been the ones that blend in best who prove to be the most dangerous and hardest to find.

And in the Bureau, with its long history of disregard for computers and geeks—especially amongst Agents—Hanssen’s differentness only confirmed what cohorts expected of those who excelled at those confounding damn boxes they had—and ignored—in their offices.

He Wanted To Be the Smartest Guy in the Room The most often stated disappointment of early film reviewers was that the movie fails to provide Hanssen’s motivations. Why—with a great job, loving wife and six children, great colleagues, public respect—did he spy? I disagree. In almost every scene we see why he was doing it. And at the end of the film he makes clear a few additional reasons. Unfortunately they are motivations nearly impossible to detect, and even harder to filter out from pools of future applicants. As he says, there was secret delight participating in the investigation for the mole, knowing all along he was the target. And there he was, enjoying the opportunity to steer them down one blind path after another, compromising their operations. Moving some of the pieces on the board, hoping the searchlight never fell in his direction. He enjoyed the power and thrill of hiding in plain sight.

How Did He Turn Out Like This? The film suggests it started with the father who rigged his failure at getting a driver’s license as a misguided attempt to toughen up his son; instead it sets Hanssen on a lifetime path of “getting even” at those—like the father—who underrate him, think they are smarter or socially adept. Whether this was the first betrayal or not, Hanssen was not about to be sucker-punched again. As his social awkwardness continued into maturity, it became submerged in a deadening of feeling, and caused him to hunger for something that wife, family, church and career could not provide.

One ego crutch was the uber-religiosity of the Catholic Church’s Opus Dei...and when that didn’t quell his lack of comfort in his own skin, there was the release found in dalliance with the stripper, and pornography. The church provided the holiness that let him reduce others to imperfect, vaguely unscrupulous nonentities he could betray the way one flicks a crumb off a tablecloth, while the occasional dip into porn provided sensations that pierced the numbness.

Better Than Sex The only hotter action: spying. Risk-taking and betrayal made him feel more alive than anything else; sub rosa payback to those who had underrated him. As a sexual and religious deviant, who hid behind geekiness and moral superiority, he made betrayal his specialty...relishing private amusement over what he considered the lesser, irreligious beings around him. We know from the history of the case he betrays his wife with a stripper [the film leaves this out since the stripper was already out of his orbit in the two months prior to his arrest], uploads pornography about his wife on the internet and sends videotapes of their lovemaking to a male friend, betrays the church by confessing to sins he continues doing, betrays his intelligence colleagues through extensive spying undercutting all their years of effort, and betrays the nation which trusted him with the secrets for its very survival in the event of nuclear attack. In the end, even after a sweetheart deal his lawyer, Plato Cacheris, gets him [and Bonnie] contingent on his telling all, he continues to dissimulate and jeer at what he considers the stupidity of colleagues, the American public, the system.

One sees a variety of his sneers throughout the film...when he is viewing the better parking spaces of the top brass at HQ, the window offices he’ll never have, the hordes of computer-averse agents, and those faces of bright, intelligent and sometimes aggressive colleagues in the halls and elevators—honorable professionals seeking to do a tough public mission. To Hanssen, they are too ordinary, unimpressed by his skills, filled with false bravado and shallow, but they all knew how to get along...to fit in. For Bob Hanssen, that was the one program, the one algorithm, this geeky computer addict could never master. And we all were going to pay because of it.

But his greatest loathing, as the film shows, he reserved for the politically astute—those who knew which rings to kiss, which requests to ignore, how to watch your flanks, when to ingratiate, who can get your ideas a fair hearing, and how to get to a higher grade. Hanssen could see the

difficult for 1st and 2nd generation immigrants to get security clearances. Yet these people, possessing needed language skills and foreign cultural understanding, are ones the IC should be hiring.)
10) Clarify and strengthen the DNI’s authority.

To promote and achieve these objectives, McConnell will closely engage with the Hill, especially with personnel on the Intelligence Committees. He will also seek closer dialogue with the White House and increased discourse with the American public.

30 March Joint DACOR-DIAA Defense Intelligence Forum

On Friday 30 March, DIAA held a Joint Forum with the Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired (DACOR) at the DACOR Bacon House at 1801 F Street NW, in Washington D.C. Dr. Walter Barrows, DIA’s Executive Representative to the National Defense University and a faculty member there since January 2005, was the featured speaker. Dr. Barrows talked on “The Five Whiskey Hotel of China in Africa” in the lovely surroundings of the DACOR Bacon House. The five “Whiskey Hotel” refers to who, what, when, where, why, and how China is dramatically increasing its sphere of influence in African countries.

Note: As an exception to forum rules, Dr. Barrows has approved this summary of his remarks.

What? Barrows explained that China’s trade with African countries increased nearly five-fold between 2000 (\$10 Billion) and today (\$50 Billion in 2006). The bulk of trading is in oil, energy, and commodities. Thirty percent of China’s foreign oil is imported from Africa. In 2006, Angola replaced Saudi Arabia as China’s most important foreign source of oil.

China has \$80 Billion invested in Africa, mostly in oil and energy sectors, but also is heavily involved in infrastructure such as road construction, telecommunications, and housing. China usually sends in its own labor supply, thus causing friction with the locals whose jobs are replaced. In return for its energy imports, China exports cheap manufactured goods to African countries. This in turn causes friction with local industries (such as textiles) which cannot compete with China’s manufacturing efficiency.

The over-all trade imbalance is yet another cause of friction with African countries.

China gives extensive foreign aid to African countries. The aid includes soft loans to governments, sending medical teams and agricultural workers, as well as security and military assistance. Of 1600 Chinese personnel supporting UN peacekeeping operations, most are deployed to African countries. China is also involved in cultural affairs, supporting tourism, scholarships, and youth volunteers. Barrows noted that there is a Chinese University in Egypt.



Dr. Walt Barrows speaking of China in Africa at the DACOR House

Who? China sends high-level delegations (Foreign Minister, President) to visit African countries and most visits are designed to announce aid projects. African leaders are also frequent visitors to China. Recently, the

Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation was held in China. Forty-eight African countries and 47 heads-of-state were represented at the meeting.

Why? China's growing involvement in African affairs is explained by its enormous appetite for oil and energy. By reaching out to Africa, China is diversifying its sources of supply and reducing its dependency on the Middle East. Additionally, China seeks greater influence in Africa and wants to shape international policy. China is also competing with Taiwan for a sphere of influence in Africa. Barrows noted that only 5 African countries recognize Taipei.

Where? While we in the West tend to emphasize China's involvement with "out-of-favor" regimes such as those in Khartoum and Harare, Beijing has diplomatic relations with all African governments except those few that recognize Taiwan. That said, it is deeply involved with Sudan and Zimbabwe.

When? While China has had 50 years of diplomatic ties with African countries, the late 1990's marked a dramatic

and deliberate change in approach, corresponding with its growing need to import oil.

How? In 2006, China published a White Paper announcing a new strategy for Africa highlighted by peaceful-coexistence, non-interference, and "no-strings-attached" loans — but with one restriction, namely, cut any relations with Taiwan. China is engaged in "political warfare" according to a recent scholarly article and the U.S. does not have such an integrated approach.

So What? In return for China's increased leverage with African countries, Africa gets an influx of money and resources to build its infrastructure. However, as noted earlier, China's approach does cause some friction. Because they predominately use Chinese labor, local workers are displaced; there is a noticeable imbalance in trade, and growing suspicion of China as resembling a colonial power. Barrows noted that in Nigeria alone, there may be one million Chinese at any one time. He pondered whether this activity would instigate a backlash or whether the Chinese will continue to increase their sphere of influence. They have placed strong incentives to African countries to deal with China.



Charlotte Gallagher, Executive Director NDICF; Richard McKee, Executive Director DACOR; Walt Barrows, speaker, and Marty Hurwitz, DIAA Board of Directors.

officials of the French and British Embassies, US State Department representatives, the newly elected Governor of Miss Hall's home state of Maryland, and representatives of CIA who came to accept a large portrait of Miss Hall, prepared by the French Government, and to be hung in CIA Headquarters.

With a film like this one that concentrates on the baseless accusations, claims and charges of the sworn enemies of our country and emphasizes the ugly, cowardly and selfish behavior of some humans under pressure, to the exclusion of the generally patriotic, humane and selfless service of our citizens during periods of conflict and national survival, will leave future generations with a totally false impression of why we fought and survived with honor.

BREACH

Reviewed by Elizabeth Bancroft (Reprinted by permission of the Association For Intelligence Officers, and Ms Elizabeth Bancroft, Executive Director)

Breach examines the final two months [for the Bureau, an especially convenient slice—I'll come back to that later], as the FBI narrowed the search to the guilty party in their midst: Robert Philip Hanssen, a key Bureau counterintelligence officer, spying for the Soviets, later the Russians.

The Bureau's Investigation of 'Ramon Garcia' Once the Bureau gets in action, it is an impressive machine—and the film shows that in an understated way. When it became clear that the spy "Ramon Garcia" was Hanssen, we see the Bureau bringing in 500 trained agents and other experts, tracking a vast array of phone logs, TDYs and travels, bank withdrawals and deposits, audio and video surveillance, down to the smallest evidentiary DNA needed to make an espionage case stick. Which is not always possible [e.g., Katrina Leung, Wen Ho Lee come to mind], but fortunately this one worked. These cases are tough to win because "being caught in the act" is what agile spies avoid. Do it right, but above all, never be observed and never get caught. If caught, leave little hard evidence. Hanssen was fairly proficient at this...up until his arrest, but only after years of classified thievery for the Russians—and the deaths of many brave foreign recruitments. And he only lasted this long because his wife, FBI brother-in-law, and even convicted FBI spy Earl Pitts,

who knew or suspected him of this activity, were either ignored by the Bureau when suspicions about Hanssen were brought to their attention, or in the case of Bonnie Hanssen, never said anything, as she benefited mightily from all the available cash.

The Acting The film deserves exaltation for the fine acting provided by Chris Cooper as Hanssen, Ryan Phillippe as Eric O'Neill - the young "G" who wants to become an agent and has his career goals halted through breaking this "case of a lifetime," and Laura Linney as Kate Burroughs, married to the Bureau [eats mainly TV dinners, lives alone, has no pets or plants], heading up the investigation to which she appears to have devoted much of her career. Linney provides a nuanced performance as a dedicated counterintelligence officer in search of prey—similar to CIA's Jeanne Vertefeuille whose single-minded focus and unusual instincts lead her to CIA traitor Rick Ames which did the trick in that case.

Burroughs is now so close to making a capture, we sense the inner frenzy restrained by years of training and the sangfroid needed at endgame when so much still can go wrong. Ryan Phillippe's Eric O'Neill is a newbie thrown into the middle of the investigation, with scant training but immense people smarts [the skills Hanssen lacks] to finesse his way into Hanssen's trust, but does so while losing his taste—as does his young wife—for a long career with the Bureau 'family.' Chris Cooper's Hanssen is more bitter and aggressive than the real laid-back and oafish Bob Hanssen, but he captures the mannerisms, the stoop, as well as the preachifying that made him seem a harmless social oddity rather than the anomic mole he was.

If So Different, Why Not Caught Earlier? "Loner," "Aloof," "Misfit" are the words trotted out when someone is caught, as associates and institutions rush to disassociate and scapegoat...to demonize the suddenly guilty. Don't believe it. There was not enough strangeness about Hanssen that would make him stand out from the variants one sees in professionals in intelligence agencies throughout the U.S. Government—the most hand-picked and scrutinized employees in the country. Particularly those with a demand for highly educated personnel in some fairly esoteric disciplines. Most are effective, dedicated employees, experts—some geniuses—trustworthy but with characteristics that have them at either end of the bell curve for social normalcy.

that this film is not a documentary but will be remembered by future generations as the history of OSS and the formation of CIA. These remarks were interpreted by me to mean we should not nit pick but accept the artistic license exercised by the authors to create a more dramatic final product. This would be OK if the end product had some reasonable relationship to the real history of the two agencies. In my view, it does not.

At the outset, let me say that the performance of the actors is truly outstanding and the technical aspects of production are all of the highest quality. My great disappointment is with the script and the carefully crafted impression generated by it that the leadership of the two organizations was made up of a group of affluent but amoral Ivy League graduates whose loyalties were more to their university and its secret society than to the Nation they volunteered to serve.

My advice to friends and relatives is to disregard the hype associated with this film. This is not a fictional history of the OSS and its successor, CIA. It appears to me to be a collection of all of the evil doings imagined and fabricated by our enemies and those disaffected employees searching for a scapegoat. I don't want my grandchildren to see it and remember only that I was a member of those secret organizations that committed the crimes and immorality shown in such spellbinding realism.

Unlike the normal use of pseudonyms "to protect the innocent," in this film fictitious names have been assigned to OSS and CIA officials who have been depicted as evil, dishonest and corrupt. This appears to have been done to prevent the officials or their families from filing law suits for libel for the terribly degrading, illegal and totally false actions attributed to the members of the intelligence community by the authors.

Adding to efforts to defame the reputation of members of the intelligence community who have been subjected to so many indignities, the name of the character played by Matt Damon is given as "Ed Wilson." The real Ed Wilson was convicted [now overturned] and did time in a maximum security federal prison for providing training and high quality explosives to Libyan terrorists. He had nothing to do with the counter-espionage office that Matt Damon heads in the movie, but the name's association with the well-known illegal activity by a retired CIA agent seems to be

the connection the writers were seeking. The use of this name appears to be another way of clouding CIA's image.

In another interesting case related to the casting for the film, the producers selected another well-known actor for a significant role as the CIA's liaison contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Alec Baldwin is an accomplished actor but he is also well-known for his political activism and his oft repeated hatred for current U.S. policy and especially its President, George Bush. One of his most memorable political acts was his promise to leave the country for good if George Bush was reelected. Now that Baldwin has become an expert on the Central Intelligence Agency as a result of working on the film for several years, he is sharing his wisdom with all who will listen. He is demanding that the CIA be totally abolished. After all, anyone who sees "The Good Shepherd," will know how bad they are and what a great threat the Agency is to our Nation!

Gen. William J. Donovan commanded the OSS from its activation in 1942 until its inactivation by President Truman in September 1945. The assets of OSS were assigned to the War Department and designated the Strategic Services Unit. Donovan returned to the practice of law in New York and held no position in the U.S. Government during the post war period. The film gives the impression that he was engaged actively in the formation of the CIA in August 1947 and in actual operations thereafter. From personal observations during my service in the OSS and CIA from 1943 through 1952 and from other veterans with longer service in the Agency, I am unable to find any person or any evidence that supports the contention of the authors that Gen. Donovan was so involved. In fact, he was specifically excluded from such activity.

My negative reaction to this film is perhaps enhanced by the contrast between it and a ceremony I attended the night before. At his Residency, the French Ambassador hosted a ceremony honoring the unusual and repeated heroism of Virginia Hall—an OSS agent—who brought great credit to herself and to the country she represented in the struggle against the Nazis. The British Ambassador also participated by reading the formal citation for the award of the Order of the British Empire. The award had been made years earlier but the citation remained classified in a London safe until now. Those present included the few surviving members of Miss Hall's family, OSS veterans,

In conclusion, Barrows offered some suggestions for the U.S. to improve its own sphere of influence in Africa:

- Engage in dialogue with African countries (fenced-off from larger global issues)
- Engage in multilateral dialogue—with China and African countries (fenced-off from larger global issues)
- Lower U.S. and Western agricultural tariffs and subsidies
- Schedule more frequent and high-level diplomatic visits to African countries

BOOK REVIEW:

True Believer – Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba's Master Spy

by Scott W. Carmichael; published 2007, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD; reviewed by Thomas D. Morelli

The Book as Strategic Communication The book's author, Scott Carmichael remains a working counterintelligence officer with DIA, and of course much of the story cannot be told. The purpose of the book is to better understand the nature and extent of the threat posed to U.S. security by the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) to recruit and run spies among us. Cuba employs a very capable corps of intelligence professionals who could be "bleeding us dry" of information and selling it to our many adversaries around the world. Cuba understands well that intelligence information is a form of currency valued on the clandestine market of international exchange. Media coverage of the Ana Montes case was woefully inadequate, and failed to capture the grave damage to national security inflicted by just one motivated woman. Few in the media seemed to care, and as a result, the public simply did not "get it."

For 10 years, until her capture and arrest on 21 September 2001, Ana Montes was DIA's primary Political-Military Analyst on Cuba. She assessed the capabilities of Cuban military forces to oppose U.S. military operations. She worked in the Latin America Division of the Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI). She joined DIA on 30 September 1985, and until 1991, was the principal analyst on Nicaragua and secondary for the El Salvador account.

The Damage Inflicted Ana Montes operated secretly as an agent of the Cuban government for the 16 years she

was employed by DIA, and did so with impunity, becoming the U.S. Intelligence Community's top analyst on Cuba at the same time she was reporting to the CIS. Montes not only passed on U.S. secrets to Cuba but also helped influence what we thought we knew about Cuba. Fidel Castro's mole was writing the intelligence community assessments of Cuba for use by U.S. war planners.

The book reviewer's background

Thomas D. Morelli, worked in the DIA Latin America Division from December 1985 – December 1990; then moved into the Soviet Division (DB-1F) as its sole Marine Transport Analyst. During his five years in the Latin America Division, Morelli was a Transportation/Logistics Analyst occupied primarily with Cuba and Nicaragua. Montes took an instant dislike to Morelli; however, that she never engaged in a professional conversation with him, despite both being principal subject matter analysts on DIA's Nicaragua team, may be another example of a "dog that did not bark." Montes summarily initialed the routing slip of Morelli's 1987 master work on the Nicaragua transportation system, with the cryptic comment that she did not need to read the document (In contrast, the Central America Joint Intelligence Team, e.g., considered the study comprehensive and applicable to tactical operations). A native of Fort Lauderdale (since 1951), he grew up steeped in the experience and imprinting influence of the Castro revolution, Bay of Pigs Invasion, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the resulting dilemma of the Cuban exile community in south Florida. During the 1980 "Mariel Boat Lift," Morelli was an officer on the City of Palm Beach Police Department, and was served a meal at the family home of deceased Fulguencio Batista, the president of Cuba deposed by Fidel Castro. Morelli is as much an ideological "opposite number" as Ana Montes is a "true believer."

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Cuba seemed to possess foreknowledge of U.S. military and intelligence operations El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama which, however, was widely attributed to the Soviet-operated communications intercept facility at Lourdes, Cuba. In light of the Ana Montes case, perhaps the Cubans helped us believe that in order to protect its highly placed mole. Montes successfully completed DIA's counterintelligence scope polygraph examination in March 1994, which is believed to be a product of a CIS capability to train agents in how to "beat" the polygraph exam.

Cuba has mounted a lasting, effective intelligence effort against the United States that deserves urgent and

dedicated effort to detect and counter the effects of CIS espionage. Cuba's efforts to penetrate the U.S. Intelligence Community did not end with the arrest of Ana Montes. CIS has the capability to penetrate the U.S. Government as thoroughly as the former Stasi – the East German intelligence service – had penetrated the West Germans during the Cold War.

Reviewer's Comment.

The following events were not mentioned in the book, and it is interesting to consider the possible relationship Montes may have had to them. **1986:** Sandinista shoot-down in Nicaragua of a U.S. Contra resupply flight and capture of Eugene Hassenfus, unraveling into the "Iran-Contra" scandal. **1987:** (a) Show-trial and execution of Cuban Gen. Ochoa, a popular and outspoken critic of Fidel Castro — for his "rogue drug trafficking." (b) Defection by Gen. Del Pino, chief of Cuban Air Force, interviewed by DIA staff (including Reviewer), about which CIS must have been desperate for reporting. **2000:** The Elian Gonzalez fiasco in Miami whose repatriation to Cuba was a huge propaganda victory for Castro. **2001/Aug 28:** Speaking engagement of Gen. Barry McCaffrey, former Dir/ONDCP, at Georgetown U, Caribbean Project, Cuba Program Meeting to address future U.S.-Cuba counterdrug cooperation — attended by Montes (and Reviewer) – in which McCaffrey excoriated U.S. policy toward Cuba. Montes sat impassively but must have been pleased, and departed at the conclusion without speaking to anyone. The Reviewer can provide DIAA a copy of the attendance list for this event, which included the Cuban Interest Section.

Havana Ana's Trade Craft The Cubans would broadcast coded messages several times a week to Montes on her shortwave radio, which she decrypted using a system provided to her by CIS. She did not remove materials from work – the information was in her head. Upon arrival at home each afternoon, Montes recorded her recollections of the day's events on a floppy disk. For years, she handed these disks to her CIS handlers about twice a month during meetings in the Washington area. At the meetings, Montes also provided verbal briefings to the Cubans and answered their debriefing questions. At that time, pager communication was an alternate system.

Shortly after the Miami-based "Wasp" network of Cuban spies was arrested in September 1998, the personal meetings with Montes ended, and explains why the

investigation failed to catch her red-handed. Montes was a motivated, high-level espionage agent with longevity and a proven record of reliability, which afforded her stature in the relationship with her CIS handlers that included consideration of her protection.

The counterspy investigation did not commence until 20 May 2001. DIA's and FBI's physical surveillance immediately determined that Montes was communicating with CIS via a pager system. She transmitted coded messages to CIS in New York City, using only certain public telephones near her residence in Cleveland Park. She also received coded messages from CIS via pager and shortwave radio, both of which required her use of an encryption/decryption system.

On the Counterintelligence Side. Never in the history of U.S. counterintelligence, was a spy identified and eventually arrested and convicted through the application of analytic methods, until the Ana Montes case. Carmichael gives large credit to Reg Brown, a DIA Counterintelligence Analyst, for coming forward in 1996 with his intuitive and factual suspicions about Montes. Brown was responsible for assessing the CIS capabilities to interfere with U.S. military operations. Montes and Brown reviewed each others draft publications and also had occasional contact at meetings. Brown's role is detailed in the book and a fascinating aspect of the case.

Carmichael portrays the exciting and suspenseful progression of dramatic events as counterspy tradecraft was applied and the investigation unfolded, and its aftermath. He describes the orchestration of cooperation among DIA top management to create the illusion of apparent normalcy for Montes (and the CIS) while evidence to support an espionage case was acquired. An essential byproduct of this kept DIA Latin America Division (RAL) also in the dark.

The grandest illusion was a "command" performance (literally) by DIA director RADM Wilson, done in a way that appeared to be merely the consequence of a bureaucratic action that impacted the entire Intelligence Community – to prevent the previously planned assignment of Ana Montes to National Intelligence Council (NIC). Later, deputy director of DI, Dave Curtin, arranged a meeting in Huntsville, Alabama that included Montes, to facilitate a FISA-warranted (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) search of her residence conducted in her

absence, and surreptitiously. Smaller "stages" were also set, including one that resulted in Montes requesting cancellation of her pre-NIC polygraph examination. Had Montes taken the exam it would have created problems for the investigation whether she passed or failed.

On 14 August 2001, a "computer problem" in RAL cubicles, in conjunction with yet another Dave Curtin meeting, were arranged to occupy Montes long enough for Carmichael's technical team to search her work space and personal shoulder luggage, resulting in some of the expected crypto evidence and part of her pager-communications plan. Before work that same morning, Montes had sent a telephone transmission to CIS in her usual manner.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, short-circuited the investigation and — as DIA began to mobilize for a U.S. retaliatory response in Afghanistan – plans shifted toward the arrest of Ana Montes. After work on 14 September, Montes sent CIS two separate, long numerically-coded pager transmissions from a public telephone at the National Zoo. RADM Wilson ordered an endgame to the investigation on 17 September, because to everyone outside the investigative "bubble," Montes was about to be assigned to the Afghanistan task force with access to target planning intelligence and the war plans.

End Game. Early the morning of 21 September, in the DIA Inspector General conference room (arranged by Dave Curtin as a "meeting"), Ana Montes was arrested by the FBI after their attempts failed to obtain her cooperation through an interview. Montes showed no sign of emotion and was "cool as ice" during her quiet removal from the DIAC in handcuffs. She pleaded guilty to the espionage charges and agreed to cooperative debriefing with polygraph verification by the FBI, thus avoiding the possibility of the death penalty. She was sentenced on 16 October 2002, to 25 years in prison.

Montes' Motivation to Commit Espionage. Those who commit espionage are driven by needs to satisfy very personal, and perceived, psychological needs such as ego and ideology. They discover that the act of espionage, at least temporarily, satisfies those needs. Carmichael explains that Ana Montes was a "true believer who spied out of conviction that Fidel Castro was both the savior of the Cuban people and a champion of oppressed masses throughout the world, particularly in Latin America. Castro

was her hero, and Montes served as his eyes and ears – and, in a sense, his voice – inside the U.S. Intelligence Community. Montes clearly viewed herself as a lonely heroine, willing to risk her freedom and her family's good name to serve the righteous cause of lifting oppression from the masses in secret league with her "king," Fidel Castro. Montes did not receive money from the Cubans and she was in it for the long haul. She was not an advocate of communism, but ideology was definitely part of her motivation. Hers was a seemingly noble cause, and Carmichael is certain that Montes reveled in her role.

Montes always took a day off from work on September 30th, the anniversary of the day she started work at DIA because, Carmichael theorizes, it was the first day she penetrated the U.S. Intelligence Community at the behest of the Cuban Intelligence Service. It was almost as though she had been born and raised in Havana, recruited into the clandestine service, and then given a false identity to enter the United States and get a job with DIA. She was a master spy and, for Cuba, the perfect spy.

MOVIE REVIEWS:

The Good Shepherd

Reviewed by Lt. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA(Ret) Chairman of The OSS Society and courtesy of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) (Reprinted by permission of the Association For Intelligence Officers, Gen Singlaub, and Ms Elizabeth Bancroft, Executive Director)

On Wednesday 13 December, I attended a pre-release showing of the film, "The Good Shepherd" at the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in downtown Washington, DC. I was invited because I am a former officer of both the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the time depicted in the film. I had expected to be asked by the producers of the film for my comments after the viewing. No such opportunity was made available to those of us who were still present when the film was over. In view of the significant number of promotional ads now underway, I feel an obligation to make my views known. The following comments are my unedited notes recorded after the viewing:

The film was introduced by former Congressman, Dan Glickman who is now the President of the MPAA. Rep Glickman pointed out that he served on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and is aware